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It would be careless for the government to have to re-open
benefit indexation
As the government reportedly plans to freeze most social security benefits for two years,
before uprating them in line with wages rather than prices, Professor Deborah
Mabbett investigates the politics of indexation.
The BBC reported earlier this month that ‘sources’ suggest that the government is
planning to f reeze social security benef its (except old age pensions) f or two years, and
then uprate them in line with wages rather than prices. It could be that the ‘sources’ are
unruly elements in the Conservative party, speaking under the inf luence of  an extended campaign about
the relationship between benef its and earnings. But it could be that the government thinks that there is
more room f or cutting benef its in a stealthy way through an opportunistic choice of  index. It has worked
the trick once, changing f rom RPI to CPI indexation (of  which more below). Can it do it again? I think not.
The art of  indexation in retrenchment polit ics is to achieve savings through a process which runs
automatically, without evident government interf erence. Tweak the index too much, and the process is no
longer automatic. Each up-rating starts to look like a polit ical decision. To paraphrase Lady Bracknell, f or
the government to change the index once is a misf ortune; to change it twice looks like carelessness.
Why do we have indexation arrangements at all? In some polit ical systems, where legislation is not easy
to get through Parliament, indexation may be a way of  locking in an agreement that the parties have
struggled to reach. Lock- in has not been an important motive f or UK governments, because they can
generally pass legislation readily. However, its close cousin, agenda control, does play a role.
Governments want to be able to pick their f ights. Consigning a policy to run automatically leaves the
government able to spend its t ime on other policies with more polit ical rewards.
When the Conservatives came to power in 1979, only some parts of  the social security system were
subject to legislation on indexation: principally old age pensions. They were meant to increase by prices
or earnings, whichever was the higher. The Thatcher government changed this to price indexation. While
there was some opposition to this change, its potential impact was not apparent to many. Opponents
f ound the case f or earnings indexation dif f icult to communicate. Ministers emphasised that price
indexation maintained the real value of  the pension, and insisted that the f ormula was not a major
assault on state provision.
The Thatcher government’s policy on other benef its appeared more radical. In 1980 it applied a 5%
‘abatement’ to increases in benef its other than the state pension (this was a period of  very high
inf lation, so benef its still rose in nominal terms). However, the government soon lost its appetite f or
high-prof ile f ights about benef it levels. The convention that benef its would increase in line with prices
became established, and was backed by statutory provisions in 1986 and 1992, although the government
never t ied its hands completely. Indexation f or the Tories had an element of  ‘stop me bef ore I kill again’:
having made some deep cuts, they accepted a commitment to maintain benef its relative to prices. Some
on the right of  the party may have f ound this too sof t, but the status quo was set nearer the centre-
right, where f iscal planners knew what Outraged of  Tunbridge Wells did not: that the f ormula would see
benef its f all steadily relative to earnings, provided the economy grew.
By the time New Labour came to power, benef its and pensions had f allen substantially relative to
earnings. In a dif f erent constitutional system, it might have made sense f or the new government to try to
lock in a better deal f or benef it recipients with new legislation, but legislation does not lock in policies in
the UK. For Labour, it was more attractive to maintain the existing indexation conventions and then claim
credit f or selectively increasing benef its by more than inf lation. The clearest example was Child Benef it,
which the Conservatives had ref used to index. Labour not only increased Child Benef it substantially; it
also enhanced provision f or children in the system of  in-work benef its. This system was greatly
expanded in scope and generosity under the new name of  Tax Credits. In short, price indexation lef t a lot
of  scope f or new credit-claiming policies. Labour had no reason to t ie its hands with more generous
indexation rules.
In both these periods, we can see how indexation was used to control the agenda: holding a def ensible
posit ion against those who would cut benef its f urther under the Tories, creating space f or more
generous but selective policies under Labour. However, to work in this way, indexation must lock in a
sustainable posit ion. Otherwise, pressure f or a change will build up, not only among af f ected recipients
but also among policy specialists. Whereas the general public pays litt le attention to indexation rules
because the year-by-year changes they produce are small, indices are the bread and butter of  policy
analysis. Policy specialists make projections and discern the cumulative ef f ects of  indexation.
Earnings rose more than prices throughout the 1980s and 90s, so pensions and benef its, indexed to
prices, f ell substantially relative to earnings. Was this sustainable? Yes, if  you believed that income
maintenance by the state could be allowed to wither away, with private savings and insurance taking the
place of  public provision. No, if  private provision f ailed to f ill the gap, and more and more people f ell into
poverty. Under Labour, tax credits were meant to provide a route f rom poverty f or working-age people,
but that still lef t pensioners out in the cold. By the time Labour came to power, pensioner poverty had
come onto the polit ical agenda. The indexation arrangements were a target, especially when the index
produced an embarrassingly small increase in pensions of  75p in 1999.  Pensioner organisations sought
restoration of  the earnings link, by then much better understood than it had been in 1980.
New Labour f ended of f  the pressure by improving the means-tested supplementation of  the basic
pension, variously named ‘Pension Credit and ‘Guarantee Credit’. This minimum pensioner income
standard was indexed to earnings rather than prices.  However, the advance of  means-testing in old age
pension provision began to produce disf unctionalit ies of  its own: more and more people were put in the
position that they would not benef it f rom saving f or their retirement, as they would not achieve an
income above the means-tested level. It was against this background that the Pensions Commission
proposed that the basic state pension should be improved and the earnings link restored. Price
indexation of  pensions was no longer seen as ‘good policy’ by specialists. Yet, f or the reasons explained
above, neither the Conservatives nor Labour wanted to give up the room f or manoeuvre that price
indexation gave them. It f ell to the Liberal Democrats to advocate a change, in the f orm of  a ‘triple lock’:
pensions should be uprated in line with wages, prices or by 2.5% at minimum. This policy was written into
the Coalit ion Agreement.
Thus George Osborne started the Spending Review with a policy that would work in quite the wrong way
f or his austerity plans. Public pensions had been on a path that would see them taking a diminishing
share of  GDP; now savings had to be f ound elsewhere. However, the blow was lessened by a new
reason to take benef its of f  automatic control: price indexation was no longer producing steady savings.
Since the f inancial crisis struck, prices have been rising f aster than wages. In mid-2012, real wages were
back where they had been in 2005 (since 2005, the Consumer Price Index has risen 23%; average weekly
earnings have risen 22%). With a period of  low growth in store, price indexation looked less attractive
than at any time in the previous three decades.
At f irst sight, there might seem to be litt le to stop the government switching to manual: f reezing benef its,
or choosing the amount to increase benef its at its own discretion. But automaticity is valuable to a
coalit ion government: the less that comes up f or debate the better. The trick is to f ind a mode of
indexation that really takes the issue of f  the agenda. Switching the price index to one that would produce
lower increases was evidently very attractive. The government announced a switch f rom RPI to CPI in
2010, although, out of  def erence to the pensioner vote, it postponed its implementation f or pensions
f or a year.
Several organisations have sought to explain the dif f erences between RPI and CPI and I won’t try to
replicate their ef f orts here (one of  the best explanations is of f ered by Jill Leyland of  the Royal Statistical
Society: link). What is interesting is how statisticians have responded to the government’s manouevre.
Back in the 1980s when the convention of  annually up-rating benef its in line with inf lation became
established, there was a serious discussion about the appropriate composition of  a cost-of - living index
f or benef it recipients, bearing in mind that their consumption patterns are not necessarily the same as
f or the population at large. The Royal Statistical Society has made it clear that it f eels that the
government has avoided this discussion with its latest change. It points out that the CPI was established
f or dif f erent purposes than benef it up-rating, and implies that the government’s adoption of  the
measure is opportunistic and unprincipled.
Does this matter? Probably not: the government will get away with a change that will save it £10 billion
per annum by 2015. The statisticians will keep nibbling away and there may be changes to the CPI that
reduce the savings it generates, but the switch is a big gain f or austerity. Few people realise that
changing f rom RPI to CPI is the largest single cutback in the government’s expenditure plans. Much more
high-prof ile measures, such as the introduction of  the ‘benef its cap’, which limits the maximum benef it a
f amily can receive to a designated f raction of  average earnings, are small beer by comparison (the
benef its cap is supposed to save about £270 million a year).
Now the siren voices on the right of  the Conservative Party are calling f or f urther changes. Having seen
real wages f all, they want to know why benef it recipients are protected. The answer is pretty obvious:
because they are already on the breadline. This is where Lady Bracknell comes in. While the polit ical
climate remains hostile to benef it recipients, it is not clear that it would stay that way if  their benef its f ell
much more. Furthermore, the government has a coalit ion to maintain, which points to taking its winnings
now and getting benef it levels of f  the agenda. And f inally, real wages will not f all f orever, so the
government could f ind itself  adopting the wrong index f or its pref erences. To have to re-open benef it
indexation once was a misf ortune; to do it twice would be careless.
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